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JOINT AND SINGLE TRIALS UNDER RULES 8 AND 14
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing permissive
joinder of offenses and defendants, authorizes offenses to be joined for trial if
they are of a similar character or if they arise from the same transaction; and
permits joinder of defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the
commission of the same offense or offenses.1 The traditional rationale for per-
missive joinder is savings of time and money by the prosecution, the defend-
ant, and the judicial system.2 joinder, however, is not without substantial
costs to the administration of criminal justice. Under current case law defend-
ants in joint trials are often treated differently from those who receive separate
trials. One example of a lack of uniformity is the admission in the joint trial
of evidence which would have been inadmissible in one of the single trials had
there been no joinder. Another important disparity is created when the defend-
ant's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination is hampered by the
fact that joinder has occurred.
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implicitly recognizes
the possibility of such disparities between joint and single trials, and provides
that when the defendant is prejudiced by joinder, "the court may order an
election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide
whatever other relief justice requires."3 Although a defendant may move for
1. FED. IR. CrL. P. 8: JOINDER OF OFFNSES AND OF DENA "rs
(a) JOINDER OF OFFNSES. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar char-
acter or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or trans-
actions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS. Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense
or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
If unjoined indictments meet the requirements of Rule 8, either the government, United
States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), or a defendant, United States v. Ny-
strom, 116 F. Supp. 771 (XV.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 237 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1956), may move
to consolidate them under FED. R. Cm!. P. 13:
TRIAL ToGrHER OF INDICTMENTS OR INFORMATIONS:
The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be
tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same
as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
2. See, e.g, United States v. Teemer, 214 F. Supp. 952, 959 (N.D.,V. Va. 1963).
3. FED. R. Cas. P. 14:
REoIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for
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single trials under Rule 14, trial courts have generally declined to exercise
their discretion to grant such motions.4
Trial and appellate courts have traditionally relied on four doctrines to sup-
port a finding of absence of prejudice through joinder and to justify denial of
relief under Rule 14. One doctrine, thought to prevent prejudice from the ad-
mission in the joint trial of evidence inadmissible in a single trial, relies upon
the judge's instructions and charge to the jury to confine the evidence to one
offense or to one defendant.5 For example, the judge will instruct the jury that
in deciding one defendant's guilt it should ignore the confession of a second
defendant inculpating the first. The effectiveness of these limiting instructions
rests upon the ability of the jury to disregard the evidence which would be
inadmissible in a single trial. The device of limiting instructions, of course, is
not unique to joint trials but is often used when evidence is admitted for a
restricted purpose or when inadmissible evidence has been presented." Despite
its frequent use, however, the efficacy of this device seems doubtful. Critics of
the doctrine have questioned whether it is realistic to expect jurors to ignore
relevant data once they have heard it,7 and the little empirical material avail-
trial together, the court may order an election or separate trial of counts, grant a
severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
If the defendant moves to consolidate under Rule 13, he may not later obtain relief under
Rule 14. Davis v. United States, 148 F2d 203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 388 (1945) ;
United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 237 F.2d 218 (3d Ctr.
1956). Motions under Rule 14 may be made at any time before verdict. See, e.g., Bedell v.
United States, 78 F2d 358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 628 (1935). If not raised be-
fore verdict, Rule 14 motions are waived under Rule 12(b) and are not reviewable. See,
e.g., Russell v. United States, 288 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 926
(1962) ; but see Mee v. United States, 316 F2d 467 (8th Cir. 1963).
Rule 8(a) came from 10 Stat. 162 (1854). Rule 8(b) was a continuation of existing
practice. Rule 13 came from the last sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 557 (1940), the final pre-
Rules codification of joinder procedure. Rule 14 came from the clause "which may properly
be joined" in the 1854 enactment. See Advisory Committee Note on Rules 8, 13, 14. For
the history of drafting the joinder rules, see Orfield, Relief fron Prejudicial Joindcr ii
Federal Criminal Cases (Part I), 36 NoTRE DAME LA,. 276, 276-80 (1961); Orfield, Col-
solidation, in Federal Criminal Procedure, 40 OmF. L. Rxv. 318, 318-20 (1961); Orfield,
Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26 F.R.D. 23, 23-29 (1961).
Because the Federal Rules did not change joinder practice, no effort will be made in this
Note to distinguish between cases under the statute and under the Rules. The federal
courts draw no such distinction. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 87 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
4. See, e.g., Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1958), cerl.
denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959) ; Note, 45 MiNN. L. Rv. 1066, 1077 (1961). Appellate courts
review such decisions only on the standard of abuse of discretion. Dowling v. United States,
249 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1957).
5. United States v. Cafaro, 26 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (offences); Blumenthal
v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947) (defendants).
6. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 13, 18 (3d ed. 1940).
7. See, e.g., Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1959) (To ignore
the "limited" evidence "would require twelve minds more perfectly disciplined than those
of the average human jurors."); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
("The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically
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able suggests that limiting instructions do more harm by emphasizing the
challenged evidence than good by erasing it.8
A second doctrine frequently used to support a denial of relief under Rule
14 is "cure by verdict" - a roughshod device designed to determine whether
the jury has followed the court's instructions and charge. In deciding whether
any prejudice has stemmed from joinder, the appellate court looks to the ver-
dict: acquittal of a defendant on any count cures any error.0 The theory as-
sumes that because the jury has been selective in its verdict, it must have been
alert throughout the trial and kept the evidence separate.'0 But this reasoning
assumes that the jury's verdict was in accord with the weight of the evidence.
Such an assumption is unwarranted; after all, an acquittal on a strong count
might be combined, in the case of an inattentive jury, with conviction on a
weak count. More important, the theory of cure by verdict ignores the possi-
bility that, had there been no prejudice from the joinder, the defendant might
have been acquitted on all counts."
A corollary of cure by verdict is "cure by concurrent sentencing," which
discounts prejudice from joinder if a single sentence is imposed for joined
offenses. In effect, the courts admit that prejudice may have occurred on one
count but state that since the defendant received only one sentence covering
both counts, he has no cause for complaint.'2 This too is a heavy-handed device
which ignores the possibility that absent joinder the defendant might have been
acquitted on all counts or might have received separate short or suspended
sentences on each count.
A final doctrine used to disprove prejudice from joinder is based on the
presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record. Any prejudice is
found harmless if, upon an examination of the whole record, the court finds
that the jury could have reached the same decision without counting the pre-
judicial matter.' 3 Critics have called this doctrine an unwarranted search into
the jury's mind,' 4 and some courts have declined to apply it.' The overwhelm-
ing evidence test also invites abuse; it often seems to be applied as a rubric to up-
ineffective ... .") (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Note, 1957 U. Iii. L. Fon.um
129, 132 (1957) ; Falkner, Evidence, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 348, 349 (1960) ; Note, 56 COLUix.
L. REv. 1112 (1956); Note, 24 U. CHL L. REv. 710 (1957). A lack of faith in curative
instructions is behind the proposed amendment to Rule 14. See note 61 infra.
8. Note, 24 U. CHL L. REv. 710, 713 n.21 (1957).
9. United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F2d 107
(2d Cir. 1963); Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1964) (joinder of
defendants).
10. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
11. Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized this in refusing to apply the
device. Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
12. See, e.g, Patterson v. United States, 324 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1963).
13. See, e.g, Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
14. Delli Paoli v. United States, Yupra note 13, at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15. Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (but applied by Bastian, J.
in dissent, id. at 992) ; Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959).
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hold convictions with no more than a pro fornza review of the admissible evi-
dence by the appellate court.16
These four traditional devices used in the joinder situation to determine
whether prejudice has occurred are inadequate for the task. Their crudity leads
to unreliability in application; while each device may reach just results in some
cases, each also has its weaknesses which make reliance upon its universal ap-
plication unsound. And even assuming that these doctrines are reliable, they
are not responsive to Rule 14. The function of the rule is to avoid prejudice be-
fore the fact by segmenting trials; the question presented by the rule is that of
the proper guides and standards for exercise of trial court discretion when the
defendant has moved for relief from prejudicial joinder. Rather than being ad-
dressed to this issue, the four doctrines are capable of use only as after the fact
determinations of whether the failure to grant the proper relief has been cured.
Since these devices fail to identify the cause of prejudice and since they do not
specify the situations in which single trials should be granted in order to pre-
vent prejudice, they provide the trial courts with no meaningful standards to
guide their exercise of discretion under Rule 14. For the same reasons, these
doctrines of cure do not permit appellate courts to ask the responsive question
and determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion under Rule 14.
Because of the inadequacy of these traditional tests, new standards are
needed to guide the trial courts in their application of Rule 14 and to permit
effective review of the trial courts' exercise of discretion. The starting point for
the development of workable standards must be an analysis of the situations
which are likely to cause prejudice in joint trials. Prejudice by joinder occurs
when there is a disparity in treatment between joint and single trials, if this
disparity causes harm to the defendant. The inquiry must be directed, then, to
determining when such harmful disparities occur in each of the three classes
of joinder.
SIMILAR OFFENSE JOINDER
The most obvious disparity in treatment between joint and separate trials
of similar offenses concerns the admission of evidence. If there were no joinder,
evidence concerning one of the transactions would often be inadmissible at the
trial of the other transaction because it failed to meet the "other crimes" rule
of evidence. This rule allows evidence concerning other crimes to be introduced
only to prove that the offense on trial was part of a previous criminal trans-
action, was connected with a larger plan or conspiracy, or was not accidental;
evidence of other crimes may also be introduced to show the defendant's un-
usual or distinctive modus operandi, to establish a motive for the offense in
question, to prove defendant's previous illicit relations with the accuser, or to
impeach a witness.17 The other crimes rule, however, is not applied to the
16. Carter v. United States, 281 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 364 U,S, 880
(1960). For a more thorough treatment, see United States v. Caron, 266 F.2d 49 (2d Cir,
1959).
17. McConuncn, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954); 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3d ed,
1940). See generally Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Oter
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961).
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charged offenses in a joint trial of similar transactions; evidence concerning
one offense is admitted, albeit with limiting instructions, even if it would be
inadmissible in a separate trial of the other offense.
A recent case in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recog-
nizes that joinder of similar offenses will often cause prejudice through the
introduction of evidence which fails to meet the other crimes test. In Drew v.
United States 18 the defendant was indicted for the robbery of a store on July
27, 1962 and for the attempted robbery of a similar store on August 13, 1962.
Joinder of the two robberies met the requirements of Rule 8(a), but because
the two fact situations were not similar enough to meet the qualifications of
the other crimes rule the failure of the trial court to grant separate trials was
held to be reversible error. The court reasoned that prejudice had occurred in
the joint trial because the evidence relating to the two offenses might have
been confused by the jury. It cited cases which upheld joinder because all the
evidence admitted in the joint trial would have been admitted in single trials,
and inferred the converse: when evidence admitted in the joint trial would be
inadmissible in separate trials, joinder is improper under Rule 14.10
The court, however, left a generous loophole in its application of the other
crimes test to similar offense joinder. It stated that when the evidentiary test
is not met but the evidence is nonetheless capable of separation by the jury,
the danger of confusion is not present and joinder is permissible.20 Although
the court also recognized that joinder might prejudice the defendant if the jury
inferred a criminal disposition from the evidence which failed to meet the other
crimes test,21 it apparently felt that this possibility of prejudice did not war-
rant separate trials under Rule 14.2
The result in Drew is correct, but its reasoning ignores the essential ration-
ale of the other crimes rule. While application of the test may prevent con-
fusion between the charged offense and past offenses, its basic function is to
exclude evidence relevant to proof of criminal disposition because such evi-
dence is generally more prejudicial than probative3P In effect, the law has
made a judgment that evidence relating to prior criminal activity should not
be submitted to the jury because it is too unreliable on the issue of whether or
not the defendant committed the offense on trial, unless the evidence qualifies
under the other crimes rule. In Drew the court ignored that rationale, and
applied the other crimes rule in form only. The other crimes test itself is de-
signed to prevent prejudice to defendants; if the rationale of the test is cor-
rect, prejudice through joinder will occur whenever the test is not met, whether
18. 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 301 F.2d
564 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Pummill v. United States, 297 F2d 34 (8th Cir. 1961).
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id. at 91-92.
21. Id. at 91.
22. The D.C. Circuit thus retained some faith in limiting instructions. See notes 5-8
supra and accompanying text.
23. See McCouncx, EvmiNcz § 157 (1954).
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or not the evidence is separable. In such situations separate trials are necessary
to effectuate the directive of Rule 14.
Prejudice may also occur in a joint trial if the defendant wants to testify on
one of the joined offenses but not on the other.24 In Cross v. United States 2
two defendants were jointly indicted for two robberies committed two months
apart. Cross wanted to testify on Count II but not on Count I; therefore he
moved for separate trials. Following denial of his motion, Cross took the stand
and testified on both counts. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, Cross argued that joinder of the offenses had been prejudicial
because it had precluded him from remaining silent on Count I. The court of
appeals implied that the privilege against self-incrimination permitted Cross
to remain silent on Count I, and that testimony on Count II was not a waiver
of this privilege.26 It also recognized that to have testified on only one count
would have accentuated a failure to testify on the other, and that Cross's only
alternative was to present weak testimony on Count 1.27 The court therefore
concluded that Cross had been coerced to testify by the joinder of similar
transactions; the fact of joint trial, in effect, had rendered him unable to re-
main silent on Count 1.28 Since Cross could have maintained his silence at a
separate trial without risking that his willingness to testify on other matters
would make an unfavorable impression on the jury, a disparity in treatment
had occurred. Recognizing this disparity, the court then examined the record
to see if Cross had been prejudiced by joinder. This examination revealed that
the testimony on Count II exculpated Cross, but that his testimony on Count I
was unconvincing and may have inculpated him.20 In addition, the jury had
heard evidence of Cross's criminal record and unsavory behavior, admissible
to impeach his testimony,8 0 which would have been inadmissible in a separate
trial of Count I if Cross had not testified at that trial. The court thus found
that Cross had been prejudiced by the joinder, and held that the failure to grant
separate trials was reversible error under Rule 14.81
If the rules derived from Drew and Cross concerning separate trials are to
be followed, guidelines for when they should be applied must be established,
It seems clear that if separation is ordered during the course of the trial, or
after trial on appeal, the result will be at least one new trial and perhaps more.
A possible solution to this danger of repeated delay and inefficiency would be
24. This problem was posed in Drew but the court declined to discuss it. 331 F-.2d 85,
89 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also, e.g., Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.
1953).
25. 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 989. See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
27. Id. at 990.
28. Id. at 989.
29. Id. at 990.
30. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
31. 335 F.2d at 989. Thus the court did not have to reach the constitutional question
of whether joinder had violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Of
course, unwillingness to reach the constitutional issue raised by the effective denial of the
privilege may have influenced the court's decision.
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to apply the tests for separation at pre-trial. For example, the court, upon the
defendant's motion for separate trials, might inspect the prosecution's evidence
in camera to determine whether the other crimes test had been met.3 2
The impracticalities of applying the other crimes test at pre-trial, however,
are rendered moot by the impossibility of preserving at pre-trial the defend-
ant's right not to testify on any or all counts. No matter how much of the evi-
dence is known to the defendant, he will be unable to make a rational choice
before trial on whether or not to testify on a given count, because of the im-
ponderables of the jury's reaction to the evidence, the strength of the presenta-
tion of the government's case, and the success of the contemplated defense.Pa
If the defendant moves for separate trials so that he may remain silent on one
count and later changes his mind - either refusing to testify in both trials or
requesting to testify in both 34 - should he be held to have waived his right to
testify or not as he chooses, or should his change of heart be ignored? Alter-
natively, if the defendant proceeds to the joint trial without objection, should
he be viewed as having waived his rights under the Cross standard, or should
he be allowed to procure a retrial on at least one count by simply asking to
testify on only one count?
Enforcement of a waiver theory against the defendant not only would ignore
the impossibility of a rational decision before trial, but also would cause the
very type of prejudice Cross sought to avoid.35 Unlike the situation of separate
trials ab initio, if similar transactions were initially joined the defendant at pre-
trial would be forced to make an irrevocable decision on whether and when to
testify and would be deprived of his usual free choice at trial. Were the waiver
theory adopted, moreover, the constitutional issue of whether waiver impinged
upon the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination would have to be
faced.
If the waiver theory is not accepted, the defendant will have two choices at
the pre-trial stage. He can demand separate trials and remain free to alter his
decision on whether or not to testify. Or he can enter the joint trial safe in the
knowledge that whether or not he actually changes his mind, he can always
32. The court could either examine the evidence itself or demand an affidavit from the
government swearing that (barring the discovery of new evidence) it would introduce no
evidence which would violate the other crimes test. This solution fails to recognize, how-
ever, that when the test is met and a joint trial permitted, additional inadmissible evidence
may be discovered at trial: were this to occur, a new trial would have to be granted or the
government would have to suppress the evidence. Yet such a failing hardly calls for the
abolition of the entire mechanism.
33. For a discussion of what factors a defendant might weigh before testifying, see
Cross v. United States, 335 F2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
34. If the defendant asserted that he wanted to testify on Count I and not on Count
II and in fact testifies on Count II and not on Count I, there is still a legitimate need for
separate trials.
35. Waiver of the privilege in exchange for criminal discovery has been viewed dimly.
See Goldstein, The State and The Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 Y=ax L.J. 1149, 1197 (1960). The fact of joinder seems no better justification for
waiver.
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procure retrial merely by asking to testify on only one count and claiming
prejudice under Rule 14. This last result is clearly unacceptable, not only be-
cause of its inefficiency but also because it would allow the defendant to harass
the prosdcution and to secure a new trial whenever the joint trial went badly.
The only escape from this dilemma of how and when to apply Cross and
Drew without vitiating the standards of prejudice evolved in those cases is the
abolition of joinder of similar offenses under Rule 8. Abandonment of similar
offense joinder will not greatly expand expenditures of time and money by
either the parties or the courts.8s The historical development of similar offense
joinder indicates that it was not designed to produce savings.87 Moreover, since
the offenses on trial are distinct, trial of each is likely to require its own evi-
dence and witnesses. The time spent where similar offenses are joined may not
be as long as two trials, but the time saved by impanelling only one jury and
by setting the defendant's background only once seems minimal. Finally, the
lack of utility in similar offense joinder may be indicated by state practice,
At present two thirds of the states make no provision for this type of joinder,88
and it seems reasonable to assume that they either have found its savings to
be negligible or have determined that any savings are outweighed by the preju-
dice caused by joinder. 9
36. Similar offense joinder is probably less common than same transaction or defend-
ant joinder, simply because it requires two unprosecuted criminal transactions rather than
only one, which is probably rarer in itself, 0
37. Rule 8(a) comes from the act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 162, which was passed to
curb an abuse by marshals in drawing indictments. The marshals were charging exhorbl-
tant fees for indictments and drawing as many indictments as they could. See Remarks of
Mr. Hale, CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 516 (1853); Summers v. United States, 231
U.S. 92, 104-05 (1913). In the debates there was no discussion of similar offense joinder;
rather it was a by-product of the regulation of marshals' fees. See generally CoNG. GLO r,
32d Cong., 2d Sess. 582-89 (1853).
38. Contra, A.AsZ A R. Citim. P. 8; Amz. R. Cux. P. 128A; Amp. STAT. ANN. § 43.
1010 (1947) (with limitations); CAL. PEN. CODE § 954 (1956); CoLo. Rav. STAT. A .
§ 39-3-4 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-57 (1958); DEL. R. Cums. P. 8; Webb
v. State, 177 Ga. 414, 170 S.E. 252 (1933); Ky. R. Cmun. P. 6.18; NED. Rav. SrAT.
§ 29-2002 (Supp. 1957); N.J. R. Calm. P. 3:4-7; N.Y. CODE Cams. P. § 279 (McKinney
1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-152 (1953); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2941.04 (Page 1953);
S.D. CODE § 34.3009 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.37.060 (1963); Wise.
STAT. ANN. § 955.14 (1958); Wyo. STAT. § 7-142 (1959). Recently Colorado and Louisi-
ana adopted Rule 8, but carefully omitted similar offence joinder. Symposium on the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1961); LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF CRIMINAL PRoCEDUR REVISiON, No. 12, tit. XIII, Indict-
ment and Information, 58-59 (1962).
39. Commentators have been generally critical of similar offense joinder. See, e.g.,
Montana Legislation Summary, 1961, 22 MONT. L. Rav. 103, 112 (1961); Maguire, Pro-
posed New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 23 ORE. L. REV. 56, 58 (1943) ; Note, 27
CONN. B.J. 380 (1953). One commentator has justified similar offense joinder by an argu-
ment that it facilitates concurrent sentencing. Orfield, A Note on Joinder of Offecies, 41
ORE. L. REv. 128, 130 (1962). But concurrent sentencing could also be achieved if separate





Rule 8(a) also provides for the joinder of several charges against a defend-
ant if they are "based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan." In same transaction joinder the possibility of prejudice from the use of
evidence inadmissible in separate trials is unlikely, since under the other crimes
rule, evidence relating to a single transaction is admissible in all trials concern-
ing the transaction.4°
A more serious question of prejudice, however, is raised by the possibility
that the defendant may want to testify on only one aspect of the transaction.
Since any testimony by the defendant will constitute a waiver of his privilege
against self-incrimination, the defendant in a joint trial will be unable to limit
his testimony.41 However, were individual trials- held on the separable offenses
subsumed in the transaction, the defendant's testimony at one trial would not
be a waiver of his privilege at another.4 But more facts must be known before
prejudice can be assumed. Since the defendant waives his privilege once li
takes the stand, and since the prosecution will be able to elicit information
concerning elements of the transaction not involved in the immediate trial,43 if
prejudice is to be shown the order of separate trials must be posited as such
that the offense on which the defendant wants to testify is tried after the offense
on which the defendant wishes to remain silent. Otherwise the testimony con-
cerning the second offense elicited in the first trial would enter the second trial
as an admission.m The fact that the order of trial is crucial to a showing of
prejudice renders the existence of prejudice highly problematical; not only
must the defendant claim a desire to testify on specific separable offenses, but
also he must argue that had there been separate trials ab in tio the order of
prosecution would have been favorable to his theory of prejudice.
A problem even more severe than the proof of prejudice is its cure. If the
defendant is able to wait until the joined trial is underway before moving for
separation, the specters of inefficiency, disclosure of the prosecution's case, and
ability of the defendant to obtain retrial at will are presented. Moreover, to
make the grant of separate trials fully effective, the court would have to fix the
order of prosecution. This would ignore the government's traditional discretion
to bring trial in any sequence it desires and would confer upon the defendant an
advantage he would not have possessed had there been single trials ab miu tio. Nor
would moving the determination to the pre-trial stage lessen the difficulty of
40. See note 17 supra and accompanying text Of course, this assumes that "trans-
action" will be defined for purposes of joinder in the same manner as in other areas of the
criminal law.
41. He must testify about everything relevant to the offense on trial. See ,VIGUa,
EvniDEcE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
42. Ibid.
43. Evidence about the whole transaction would be relevant to the trial of a part of it.
See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
44. See McCoaancx, EvmExcE §§ 230, 239 (1954); 4 WxGmo., EvrENncE § 1066
(3d ed. 1940); 5 WaxmoaR, EvmnxcE § 1416 (3d ed. 1940).
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preventing prejudice. As in the similar offense joinder context, there is no rea-
son to assume that the defendant would be able to predict in advance of trial
those counts on which he would desire to testify, and again it would seem
inappropriate to bind the defendant to his pre-trial prediction by a waiver
doctrine.45
Although analogous considerations led to a decision that similar offense join-
der should be abolished, 46 this result seems unwarranted in same transaction
joinder. Initially, same transaction joinder is productive of judicial efficiency
and savings of time, money, and energy for both the prosecution and the ac-
cused. More important, such joinder is to the advantage of many defendants,
since the bringing of separate trials increases the statistical probability of
obtaining at least one conviction and since fragmentation of a transaction into
separate offenses can readily be used to harass the accused. Finally, the like-
lihood of a defendant wishing to testify on only one aspect of a single trans-
action seems slight. These factors indicate that a solution based on total
abolition of same transaction joinder would be misguided.
Unlike similar offense joinder, no universal and acceptable remedy exists to
prevent the problematical prejudice caused by same transaction joinder. But
by providing different rules for the pre-trial and trial stages at least palliative
measures can be constructed. If at pre-trial the defendant may freely elect
separate trials by showing only hypothetical prejudice, it is unlikely that sub-
stantial harm will result. Because of added personal expense, the increased
probability of at least one conviction, and the infrequency with which the prob-
lem arises, few defendants will elect separate trials under this rule, the danger
of harassment of the prosecution will be slight, and little time or money will
be lost. More positively, the defendant will be given a realistic chance to invoke
his constitutional right, since it is possible that the trials will be brought in an
order favorable to him. But after trial has begun and at the appellate level, a
court should insist that defendants go beyond a claim based on the hypothetical
possibility of prejudice and demonstrate that prejudice has in fact been caused
by joinder. This proof would, of necessity, entail a showing of the order of
trial had there been separation ab initio. While such proof will be concededly
difficult, and often impossible, to allow a defendant to argue prejudice based
on mere supposition at this stage would needlessly paralyze all joint trials of
multiple charges arising out of the same transaction. This dual solution im-
plicitly involves the previously rejected concept of waiver, but since it is im-
practical to permit the defendant a free choice at trial or on appeal, the possible
disability seems warranted.
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS
Joinder of defendants under Rule 8(b) creates an obvious disparity between
joint and single trials in regard to the admission of evidence. Since the rule
45. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 3740 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74: 553
CRIMINAL TRIAL JOINDER
provides that each defendant need not be named in each count,47 it implicitly
authorizes evidence to be received which is unrelated to an accusation against
a particular defendant.48 Thus A and B could be charged with bank robbery in
Count I, and in Count II B alone could be charged with armed robbery. If A
had a severed trial on Count I, the evidence on Count II would be inadmis-
sible; but it is allowed in the joint trial. Another example of disparity in ad-
mission of evidence is the introduction of evidence of criminal disposition de-
signed to impeach A's testimony.49 If B had a severed trial, this evidence
against A would be inadmissible in that trial.
But the mere fact of disparity is not sufficient to show prejudice from join-
der.50 To determine whether the inadmissible evidence has caused prejudice,
it is necessary to distinguish between the two basic reasons for holding evidence
inadmissible in the typical single trial: usually if the evidence is relevant and
probative but unreliable or highly inflammatory, it will be excluded because
of its prejudicial effect; if, however, the evidence has little probative value be-
cause of its lack of relevance, then it will be e-xcluded primarily to -ave time
and money.51 Although introduction of the first type of inadmissible evidence
may always cause prejudice at the joint trial, admission of the second type will
only cause prejudice if it unduly delays the trial. Yet the basic rationale for
joinder of defendants is to prevent the inefficiency of separate trials in which
the majority of evidence and witnesses are identical. Thus it is unlikely that
the waste associated with production of evidence relating to only one defendant
will outweigh the ultimate savings of a joint trial. However, two cavcats re-
main. If large portions of the evidence are irrelevant to a defendant, for ex-
ample where he is a minor accomplice, a joint trial might be used to harass
him by forcing him to employ counsel and to be present throughout a trial
largely unconnected with his offense. In this situation, the trial court should
exercise its discretion under Rule 14 and sever the defendant. r2 Another in-
stance of prejudice may occur in a long or complicated trial if the evidence
relating to each defendant becomes confused in the mind of the jury. Again,
47. FED. R. Camn. P. 8, supra note 1.
48. See, e.g, Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
964 (1956).
49. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 335 F2d 987, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Dunaay v.
United States, 205 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
50. In some states disparity alone is grounds for severance. The defendant may be
granted a severance as of right: (a) in all cases, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 319 (1959) ; (b)
in capital cases, e.g., Ann. STAT. § 43-1802 (1947); (C) in felonies, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
AqNn. § 39-7-11 (1953).
51. See Rule 45, UmraoRU RULES OF EvIDEncE; McCouRcn, EDENcE §§ 151-52
(1954).
52. Under current case law none of the following are grounds for relief: unequal proof,
United States v. Sherman, 84 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part, 171 F.2d 619
(2d Cir. 1948); expense, United States v. Van Allen, 28 F.R.D. 329, 339 (S.D.X.Y.),
aff'd, 288 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1961); being named in only a few counts, United States v.
Nomura Trading Co, 213 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); lesser role in the crime,
West v. United States, 311 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1962).
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Rule 14 would enable a judge to exercise his discretion and sever defendants
to avoid this potential harm.53
Frequently, of course, evidence admitted against one defendant will have a
harmful impact upon his co-defendant, against whom it is inadmissible. The
best example of such a situation is the introduction in the joint trial of one
defendant's confession or admission which inculpates his co-defendant.64 The
majority of the federal courts have apparently recognized that the admission
of such evidence is harmful to the co-defendant, and in an attempt to cure the
harm have required that the inculpating portions of the statement be deleted.6
And at least one judge has argued that if it is impossible to delete all references
to the co-defendant, then either the statement must be excluded or the defend-
ants severed.56 Conscientious application of these devices seems adequate to
prevent prejudice to the defendant.5 7 But if such statements are non-editable
and are excluded, then the government might well claim prejudice from join-
der, since it would have been able to use the evidence against the confessing
defendant had there been single trials. Rule 14 recognizes governmental claims
of prejudice,5 8 and in such cases defendants should be severed. The one re-
maining difficulty is the timing of the prosecution's motion for severance. If
the government were allowed to wait until trial, it could use the confession as
a means of obtaining retrial of one or both defendants. To preclude this possi-
bility and to avoid a double jeopardy question,5 9 it would seem reasonable to
require the government to deliver to the court the statements or confessions
53. At present, the length of trial, United States v. Berman, 24 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), and its complexity, Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
sib norn. Benedec v. United States, 375 U.S. 836 (1963), are not grounds for severance.
Some courts, however, have recognized these perils of joint trials. They insist that counsel
state his and his client's name each time he takes an active part, provide the jury with a
seating chart of the defendants, permit pencil and paper for note-taking, and allow the jury
to withdraw with a bill of particulars. Note, Development in the Law: Crininal Con.
spiracy, 72 HlAv. L. Rxv. 920, 981 (1959).
54. See, e.g., Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955).
55. Note, 24 U. Cmi. L. REv. 710, 713 (1957). The first question to arise is what is
inculpatory. Some courts merely substitute "Mr. Blank" for the name of the inculpated
defendant. But this usually is not enough, see Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962,
969 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
56. United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing), aff'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
57. The procedure for examination of statements held by the prosecution cannot depend
upon a motion by the defendant because often the defendant will not know of the state-
ments. The initiative must come from the prosecutor. But cf. Note, The Prosecutor's Con-
stitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
58. United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), states that co-defend-
ants have no right to be tried with each other, and that therefore the government can move
with success to sever them if prejudice is shown.
59. There is no question of double jeopardy when the defendant moves under Rule 14,
United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But if the government moves
during the trial, according to some commentators jeopardy might attach. Orfield, Relief




it plans to introduce for inspection in camera at a pre-trial stage' 0 Unless all
reference to the co-defendants were deleted, separate trials would then be
granted.
Between the two basic categories of evidence inadmissible at a single trial
time-consuming-and-not-relevant and relevant-but-prejudicial - there exists
an area of uncertainty. For example, if a defendant is tried together with an
habitual criminal and proof of the latter's character is admitted,61 is this evi-
dence relevant and probative on the issue of the defendant's guilt? Is it pre-
judicial? Another example is when one defendant pleads guilty. 2 Classification
of evidence such as this is not easily made in the abstract, and can be best
resolved by the trial judge; the infinite variety of factual patterns precludes
rational generalization. It is in just such cases that the discretion prescribed by
Rule 14 becomes necessary.63 If trial and appellate courts administer Rule 14
60. The Advisory Committee has drafted an amendment to Rule 14 which would
establish an in camera procedure. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance, the
court may ask the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in
camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government in-
tends to introduce. Proposed Amendments, 34 F.RD. 419 (1964). But the amendment is
not sufficient to solve the problem of inculpatory confessions, because it sets no standards
to guide the trial judge in editing confessions and granting severances.
A further problem arises in the uncommon situation where the government obtains an
un-editable confession during a joint trial but the confessing defendant refuses to take the
stand or to plead guilty. The decision to exclude the confession, to admit the confession, or
to admit the confession and sever the co-defendant probably must be left to the discretion
of the trial judge.
61. Commentators have argued that joinder with an habitual criminal may be pre-
judicial. See OpxrELD, CRMIMAL PRocEDuRE FRom ARREsT To APPax,. 319 (1947); Note,
36 COLum. L. REv. 1359, 1360 (1936). But courts do not grant severances because of a
co-defendant's prior convictions, United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), even if they are for similar offenses, United States v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481 (NV).
Mlo. 1962).
The same type of prejudice can occur not only when the evidence of criminality is ad-
mitted against one party but also when it is a matter of common knowledge, see, e.g., In rc
Gottesman, 332 F2d 975 (2d Cir. 1964), or when it is greatly publicized, United States v.
Bentvena, supra.
62. See, e.g., Slocum v. United States, 325 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1963). See also United
States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949), where a new trial was granted because the
trial judge mentioned in his charge a co-defendant's plea of guilty.
63. Other matters must also be left to judicial discretion. For example, defendants can
be joined only by the conspiracy count but also tried for separate substantive offences.
See note 47 supra and accompanying text. When the conspiracy count fails to reach the
jury, technically the diverse counts against separate defendants are misjoined; but in the
absence of governmental bad faith, there is no right to a severance. United States v.
Schaffer, 266 F2d 435 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 362 U.S. 511 (1960).
Also, defendants argue that joinder deprives them of effective compulsory process when
they want a co-defendant's testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Berman, 24 F.R.D. 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). As an accused, the co-defendant need not testify in the joint trial. If the
co-defendant is tried first, he may be more willing to testify or unable to invoke the privi-
lege in the severed proceeding. Arizona and California have recognized this problem and
permit a defendant who wants a co-defendant's testimony to move for a directed verdict
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in such situations with due regard for the possibility of prejudicial disparity
between joint and single trials, harmful errors can be prevented, and excessive
reliance on a post-trial determination of cure tinder the traditional doctrines
can be avoided.
Examination of Rules 8 and 14 thus shows that the current similar treat-
ment of the three types of joinder is oversimplified and productive of prejudice.
Considerations of the admissibility of evidence and of the defendant's right not
to testify demand differentiation between the three types of joinder authorized
by Rule 8, and indicate the desirability of abolishing similar offense joinder.
When applied to Rule 14 motions to sever, these same considerations yield
different results with regard to the two remaining types of joinder. While
joinder of defendants must remain substantially within the discretion of the
trial judge, opportunities for the defendant to obtain separate trials of offenses
joined because they arise out of the same transaction should be substantially
revised. The result lacks the nice symmetry of the current rules, but it pre-
serves rights of more general importance than the savings gained by joinder.
of acquittal for the co-defendant. CAL. PEN. ConE § 1100 (1956); Ariz. R. CRim. P. 262.
This frees the co-defendant to testify, but only when there is a weak case against him. Tlls
problem must also be left to the trial court's discretion.
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